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PREFACE
Available evidence suggests that the overall international 
economic environment of the 1990s will not be a significant 
improvement on that of the 1980s and tha t it is likely to be 
influenced as much by trends inherited from the past as by 
the opportunities and challenges arising from the process of 
change in the world economy.
The past decade has seen an increased degree of interde­
pendence within and among different groups of countries 
through trade, investment and technological innovation. This 
interdependence has been reinforced by closer financial linka­
ges which, in turn, have increased the influence of interna­
tional finance over trade. Meanwhile, the high geographical 
concentration of economic power has evolved towards a 
multipolar structure as dynamic new actors have emerged 
and established players have joined forces thrcugh the forma­
tion of regional economic groupings. The logic of economic 
interdependence has gained added force from the growing 
concern about ecological phenomena and about their poten­
tial for cumulative interaction with economic and social 
factors.
In addition to the growing integration of the world 
economy, the 1990s will also inherit a number of unresolved 
problems. One such problem is the persistence of imbalances 
in the world economy, particularly between the major 
developed market economies, and the coexistence of growth 
in the developed world and in some developing countries 
with stagnation or regression in large parts of the Third 
World. Another is the insufficiently fast movement towards 
an effective solution of the external debt problem. A third 
has to do with the persistence of low prices for the principal 
commodities exported by developing countries. And yet 
another relates to excessive rates of population growth in
some countries and skewed age distribution patterns in 
others.
Superimposed on these policy dilemmas are a number of 
incipient developments which, at least in the short-term, 
could make for uncertainty. Among these are: the easing of 
international political tension and progress towards disarma­
ment; the greater integration of the Soviet Union and other 
countries of Eastern Europe into the world economy; the 
rapid evolution of trade in new products, especially services; 
and the increasing use of new financial instruments and tech­
niques.
Just as no country or group of countries has remained 
untouched by the changes experienced in the 1980s, so is it 
that no country can, in the 1990s, achieve its economic and
social objectives in isolation. In the highly interdependent 
and complex world I have described, the pursuit of the 
national interest requires policy makers to take into account 
a wider range of variables and considerations than before. 
For small countries, the constraints imposed by the external 
environment will influence the methods by which they pur­
sue their national interest, if not their perception of that 
interest. For countries with a heavier weight in the world 
economy and whose policies, therefore, could ultimately re­
bound on themselves through their impact on trading part­
ners, the national interest requires that account should in­
creasingly be taken of the likely international consequences 
of domestic policies.
The conclusion to draw is tha t  world economic stability 
and growth increasingly require national policies to be co­
ordinated in order both to avoid inconsistencies among them 
and to ensure that they accord with global objectives. This 
calls for a corresponding development of international econo­
mic co-operation and for a systemic management of interde­
pendence so as to achieve sustained global economic growth, 
development and trade.
In these circumstances, development can no longer be 
thought of as a purely national effort, but rather as a goal of 
common interest and an object of collective responsibility. 
Only thus can the vicious circle of stagnation that has gripped 
most of the developing world be broken. The success of the 
domestic policies of developing countries aimed at stability 
and development at a socially-desirable pace is crucially 
dependent not only on a substantial improvement in the ex­
ternal economic environment but also on the will of the 
international community deliberately to lend effective sup­
port to the development process. I shall discuss various 
aspects of this theme in the four lectures.
In the first lecture, I propose to examine the interaction 
between the external environment and domestic policies. In 
the second lecture, I shall discuss the prospects of develop­
ment finance. I he third lecture will address questions relating 
to the world commodity economy. Finally, in the fourth 
lecture, I shall consider some issues relating to the institu­
tional framework of international economic relations and the 
role of UNCTAD in the development co-operation dialogue.
Geneva 
June, 1990 K. K. S. DADZIE
Lecture 1
THE ENVIRONMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT: EXTERNAL 
CONDITIONS AND DOMESTIC POLICIES
Introduction
It is widely accepted that, taking initial conditions as given, 
the growth performance of a developing country depends
primarily on its own policies, institutions and economic 
structure. Of these three factors, policies play a key role since 
they strongly influence the evolution of the other two. Yet, 
while there can be little doubt about the primary importance 
of domestic policies, the role of the external environment 
cannot be underestimated. Its influence stems from the 
dependence of developing countries on external trade and 
finance. This dependence is, of course, a manifestation of 
underdevelopment. For one thing, developing countries rely 
on imports to operate existing capacity and to expand it 
through new investment. For another, their ability to gene­
rate the foreign exchange needed through exports depends 
crucially on the state of world markets. Even when world 
economic activity is buoyant, export earnings tend to fall 
short of the level of imports which would permit a socially- 
acceptable level of activity and growth. External financial 
transfers are, therefore, needed to close the foreign exchange 
gap. They also allow investment to be raised above the 
level permitted by domestic resources alone, thereby closing 
the so-called savings gap. But the cost and availability of 
finance are themselves beyond the control of developing 
countries.
Thus, international trade and finance help reduce the 
constraints of domestic supply capabilities, investible resour­
ces and market size on economic growth and development. 
At the same time, they expose developing countries to ex­
ternal shocks. A country which is heavily dependent on 
imports of intermediate and capital goods will see its produc­
tion and growth decline when foreign exchange availability 
is reduced because of a collapse in its export prices, unless it 
gains increased access to external finance. Similarly, a rise in
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interest rates on external debt and/or a cutback in lending 
results in an increased share of export earnings being alloca­
ted to debt servicing rather than to imports. The country 
thus needs to adjust its balance of payments to changed ex­
ternal parameters. Policy re-orientation is called for when 
such changes are permanent. Even when they are transitory, 
however, countries often find it necessary to adjust because 
additional support from multilateral institutions does not 
always make up for the foreign exchange shortfall, and such 
support is conditional upon the implementation of certain 
policy measures.
Problems of Adjustment
In evaluating the likely effectiveness of payments adjustment, 
one would have to address two main questions: first, whether 
and to what extent the country can raise its export earnings 
or cut its imports without suffering a substantial loss of o u t­
put, investment and growth and second, whether and to what 
extent declines in growth and investment would be transitory 
and reversible after a period of austerity, even though exter­
nal conditions remained unfavourable.
Answers to these questions depend on the magnitude of 
external shocks, the extent of official external financial sup­
port, the level of industrial development reached, and domes­
tic social and political institutions. When swings in external 
parameters are sizeable, the answer to  the first question is 
usually negative. The answer to the second question also 
tends to be negative in countries lacking a large and flexible 
tradeable goods sector, and social and political institutions 
that facilitate burden-sharing among different economic 
sectors and social classes. In such circumstances, most develo­
ping countries would be unable to avoid loss of output and 
growth, and to reverse the decline through their own policy
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efforts alone, so long as external conditions remained hostile.
This has, indeed, been the experience in the 1980s. 
Almost all developing countries suffered from a sharp decline 
in external resource transfers, owing, on the one hand, to 
worsened terms of trade and sharply-increased interest rates, 
and, on the other, to cuts in new lending. The cumulative 
cost of declines in the terms of trade reached 10 per cent 
of GDP, that is, about two years’ growth in good times, and 
the entire output growth of the 1980s in a large number of 
countries.
Resource loss in debt-troubled countries through the 
decline in net financial transfers in the early 1980s was also 
considerable, amounting, on average, to almost 5 per cent of 
GDP. A number of countries turned from being net recipients 
to being net providers of financial resources. Most of the 
others, particularly in Africa, continued to be net recipients, 
but at much lower levels than before.
These losses necessitated a substantial adjustment of 
trade volumes. In most cases, export volumes were raised 
considerably, but the scale of adjustment required made it 
impossible to avoid drastic import cuts. Indeed, the wide­
spread co-existence of increased export volumes and reduced 
import volumes was unprecedented in the 1980s. Conse­
quently, per capita domestic production either stagnated or 
declined, and in many countries the absolute level o f real 
domestic output fell.
The upshot was that the volume o f resources, both ex­
ternal and domestic, available for consumption and invest­
ment declined* drastically in a large number of countries, 
exceeding 20 per cent in some cases. Although per capita 
consumption fell too, it was investment that bore the brunt 
of the adjustment. Domestic savings fell a little in many 
countries, but national savings, i.e. domestic savings less net 
factor payments abroad, declined sharply as interest pay­
ments escalated. This, together with the cut in bank lending,
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was the main factor depressing the pace of capital accumula­
tion.
This is not to deny that important differences exist 
among developing countries regarding growth and macro-
economic stability. It is true that almost every developing 
country suffering from persistent macroeconomic instability 
has not only incurred significant terms of trade and financial 
shocks but also experienced a drastic decline in growth. 
However, not every developing country that incurred such 
shocks has had the same experience regarding growth and 
macroeconomic stability. A small number of countries in 
hast and South-East Asia successfully absorbed such shocks, 
and reversed the initial decline in economic activity, restoring 
a satisfactory rate of growth with price stability.
Differing policy approaches no doubt played an impor­
tant role. However, it would be simplistic to explain the 
collapse of growth and persistent macroeconomic instability 
in a large number of developing countries solely in terms of 
the pathology of policy-making. F'or one thing, policy makers 
do not enjoy the same degree of autonomy and discretion 
everywhere; they are subject to social and political con­
straints that are closely related to institutional arrangements. 
Thus, for certain policies to be effectively applied, certain 
institutions and organizations would need to be reformed, 
and, in some cases, suppressed. But since such arrangements 
are deep-seated reflections of a coun try ’s history as well as 
political and cultural traditions, such changes may be diffi­
cult to undertake, and attempts to do so may prove disrup-
tlVe fcor many developing countries, adjustment in the 1980s 
was determined by their ability to initiate export-led growth 
following an initial period of austerity to accommodate the 
external shocks-, the expectation was that exports would 
generate the foreign exchange needed to raise imports, and 
that the consequent growth would provide additional domes­
tic resources for consumption and investment. Experience
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has shown that the scope for such a sequence of events varies 
across countries. Economies with a large tradeable goods 
sector, substantial industrial capacity and a production 
pattern similar to that of their major trading partners, find it 
easier to raise export earnings following a currency devalua­
tion: they are able to do so without having to depress output 
and real wages significantly and without running a high risk 
of triggering a devaluation-price-wage-devaluation spiral. 
Moreover, if the overall rate of investment can be prevented 
from falling too much, the capacity to produce exports and 
import substitutes can be enlarged. Then, as export-led 
growth picks up, inflation can be reduced and real wages 
raised without eroding competitiveness. Such has been the 
performance of certain countries in East and South-East Asia.
The possibilities for this kind of adjustment, however, 
are limited in countries, like several on this continent, where 
the export sector is heavily concentrated on a few primary 
commodities. Even where the export structure is diversified 
and includes manufactured goods, but where the foreign 
trade sector is small, adjusting the trade balance may necessi­
tate substantial cuts in imports, particularly of investment 
goods. Unless the initial rate of investment is very high, that 
will constrain the ability to generate exports and growth over 
time.
Thus, while most developing countries relied increa­
singly on currency depreciation to attain the required trade 
adjustment, for many of them, particularly those with a debt 
overhang, this proved destabilizing. Since the burden of 
adjustment fell primarily on investment, it became increa­
singly difficult to  sustain export growth without repeated 
currency depreciations. At the same time, these measures 
triggered sharp changes in income distribution and subse­
quent efforts to recoup lost purchasing power by the worse- 
off income groups generated inflationary pressures. The resul­
ting instability in domestic prices and in the real exchange
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rate, in turn, were not helpful to exports.
External Shocks, Adjustment and Macroeconomic Disorder
While excessive currency depreciations and cuts in investment 
constituted the most important supply-side ingredients of the 
stagflation that has affected many countries, external shocks 
and the subsequent payments adjustment have also generated 
destabilizing influences on the demand side, by adding to 
budget deficits and monetary expansion. The reconciliation 
of different policy objectives has thus proved very difficult.
In many countries, demand pressures have been building 
up since the early 1980s in large part due to external shocks: 
the rise in international interest rates increased the interest 
bill on the public sector’s external debts; and the collapse of 
commodity prices reduced both the revenues from export 
taxes as well as the direct export earnings of the public 
sector. Cutbacks in external lending also affected public 
sector finances. Many countries, therefore, have been able to 
adjust bv cutting import volumes and/or raising exports only 
to find the imbalance in their external accounts transformed 
into a domestic monetary and financial imbalance.
Cuts in public sector investment and imports provided 
part of the foreign exchange needed by the public sector to 
compensate for the reduced financial transfers from abroad. 
However, as observed earlier, currency depreciation and trade 
policy liberalization, together with stagflation, worsened the 
fiscal balance. Currency depreciations in particular raised real 
government revenues from trade in countries where trade 
taxes have been an important source of revenue, but gene­
rally not enough to offset the revenue losses stemming from 
import cuts and commodity price declines. Moreover, 
reduced imports by the private sector and tariff reductions 
increased budget deficits, particularly where tariffs and other 
import charges were an important source of government reve­
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nue. Depreciations also raised the cost of government expen­
ditures, for instance, by increasing the real burden of interest 
payments abrpad — in many countries, including both highlv- 
indebted and low-income countries, the domestic currency 
value of interest payments in real terms rose by more than 40 
per cent — and by raising the cost of public sector invest­
ment, which has a high import content. The evidence for a 
number of countries suggest that these effects taken together 
account for more than one-half of the average budget deficits 
incurred in recent years.
Fiscal adjustment in the 1980s has clearly taken place 
under extremely unfavourable circumstances. In general, it 
has involved spending cuts rather than revenue increases. In 
the few countries where revenues rose, it was largely due to 
increased prices of public sector goods and services, and sales 
of public assets. In most countries, tax revenues declined or 
stagnated, along with slower economic activity and faster in­
flation. While many governments found it very difficult to 
reduce the public-sector-borrowing requirement despite dras­
tic cuts in spending, cutbacks in foreign borrowing forced 
them to shift the financing of deficits to domestic markets 
where the resulting higher interest rates added further to 
fiscal deficits. In some countries, these factors gave rise to an 
unprecedented pace of domestic debt accumulation.
Two findings emerge from these experiences, f  irst, the 
budget deficits and monetary expansion of the 1980s were 
not the result of deliberate policies: they have followed 
rather than led inflation. Second, as was the case in the deve- 
loped-market-economy countries during the 1970s, the per­
sistence and acceleration of inflation reflected, in large* 
measure, the increased difficulty of reconciling the income 
claims of different social and occupational groups. Orthodox 
policies of budget cuts and monetary restraint succeeded in 
i educing inflation only temporarily, and sharply increased 
unemployment. The resulting deterioration in income distri­
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bution often exacerbated social tensions, often leading to 
even faster inflation.
An urgent need thus arises to restore monetary and 
financial stability and growth in many developing countries. 
To attain stability, it is essential for these countries to 
reduce reliance on currency depreciations and to strengthen 
public-sector finances through increased tax revenues. Both 
objectives, however, call for a revival of growth and, hence, 
for lifting investment from its current depressed level, parti­
cularly in basic infrastructure and in the tradeable goods 
industries. Three major elements would, therefore, need to be 
combined in order to restore growth and stability. First, it is 
necessary to eliminate the payments constraint on investment 
and growth through debt reduction. Second, increased policy 
efforts would be needed in developing countries to improve 
the size and allocation of domestic resources through reforms 
in the areas of trade, the financial sector, public enterprises 
and government finances. Reforms in these three areas must 
be internally consistent, include poverty alleviation measures, 
and focus on investment and economic growth as their final 
objectives. Lastly, an improved trading environment and, 
particularly, increased market access for developing countries 
would be essential for a growth-oriented payments adjust­
ment. If there are serious shortcomings on any one of these 
fronts, efforts on the others are likely to be frustrated.
Concluding Observations
While these policy approaches are a necessary condition for 
the revival of growth and development, they are not suffi­
cient for most African countries. A substantial infusion of 
new external resources through concessional flows would also 
be required in sub-Saharan Africa. Even such new resources 
cannot be expected to yield quick benefits in terms of increa­
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sed export capacity. For one thing, part of any increase in 
external resource availabilities would be needed to mitigate 
poverty and malnutrition. For another, resources would need 
to be diverted to areas which do not immediately generate 
export capacity, such as physical and human infrastructure. 
Such infrastructure is necessary to provide an adequate basis 
for future industrialization, but its impact on non-traditional 
exports is inevitably slow. Furthermore, increased attention 
would need to be given to agriculture and other primary 
industries in order to accelerate primary import substitution, 
particularly in food. This will help essentially to reduce the 
import requirements of consumption, export and investment 
growth, but cannot be expected quickly to provide substan­
tial balance-of-payments relief.
The domestic policy efforts o f African countries — and 
indeed of many other developing countries — will, therefore, 
need to be supplemented throughout the new decade by 
increasing amounts of external resources, taking into account 
the need to speed up structural transformation and keep pace 
with population growth, as well as to compensate for any 
further adverse changes in the external environment.
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Lecture 2
DEVELOPMENT FINANCE BEYOND THE DEBT CRISIS
Introduction
In the first lecture, I concluded that the revitalization of 
growth and development in many developing countries 
depends on their own efforts being supported by increasing 
amounts of external finance throughout the coming decade. 
The need for sustained financial support derives also from the 
perverse experience of the 1980s, whereby many developing 
countries became net exporters of financial resources. Today, 
I propose first to discuss the inadequacy of development 
finance in the 1980s and then, against this background, to 
assess various possibilities for increasing both the volume and 
the quality of development finance in the 1990s.
The Inadequacy of Development Finance in the 1980s
In approaching the question of the financing of development, 
it is essential for one to bear in mind the radically-different 
role that is currently being played by international financial 
flows. Prior to the 1980s, international financial co-operation 
and the operation of international finance markets almost 
invariably produced a positive net transfer of resources from 
developed to developing countries. This meant tha t  invest­
ment in the latter countries could proceed at a more rapid 
pace than vould  have been possible on the basis of domestic 
savings alone. There was wide agreement that this allowed the 
process of transformation and development in these econo­
mies to proceed faster than would have otherwise been the 
case.
Since the mid-1980s, however, international finance has 
played exactly the opposite role. Perhaps the most significant 
event of that decade was the sharp fall in net financial flows, 
• accompanied by an unprecedented reversal of net financial 
transfers to many developing countries. By 1988, total net
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resource flows to developing countries had shrunk in real 
terms to half of the record volume reached in 1981, from 
US$182.7 billion to US$93.5 billion.
In sub-Saharan Africa, net resource flow's have risen in 
real terms since 1985 but not enough to offset a 30 per cent 
drop between 1982 and 1984. In 1988, total net flows still 
remained somewhat below the 1982 peak. While bilateral and 
multilateral donors stepped up their official development 
assistance to the region, there has been a virtual collapse of 
private lending. Overseas Development Agency (ODA) now 
represents about 70 per cent of total flows. Aggregate net 
transfers remained positive, albeit reduced. However, for a 
number of debt-distressed countries, they became signifi­
cantly negative.
The debt crisis of the 1980s was a major factor in this 
unfavourable turn of events. Since 1983, rapidly-shrinking 
net financial flows together with persistently-high interest 
payments on external debt have led, as just indicated, to the 
emergence of a net transfer of financial resources from deve­
loping countries to the rest of the world. This transfer
amounted to an estimated US$36 billion in 1988. The bulk 
of this amount was accounted for by countries that could not 
afford to transfer resources abroad. The financing of this 
transfer required domestic investment to be compressed 
below the levels which would have been allowed by the 
domestic savings effort. For a few developing countries 
whose economies were growing rapidly and whose savings 
rates were already very high, this was not a serious problem; 
but for most debt-distressed countries, the reductions in 
investment imposed by the negative net resource transfer had 
a significant impact on their growth performance and on 
their capacity to adapt their productive structures to a 
changed external environment.
Another fundamental change in development finance 
was the sharp fall in private flows, and the attendant rise in
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the share of official flows in total transfers. By 1988, the 
share of official flows of various kinds, including ODA, had 
grown to two-thirds, a proportion higher than that prevailing 
in the early 1 960s, before the wave of heavy borrowing by 
developing countries from commercial banks. But this shift 
was entirely due to the collapse of private flows, rather than 
to the expansion of official finance. The debt crisis, in fact, 
led to a sharp contraction of export credits as well as of com­
mercial bank lending. Foreign direct investment flows also 
declined as the climate for investment deteriorated. Conse­
quently, official development assistance has remained the 
backbone of development finance, accounting for half of 
total net flows in 1988. Even so, concessional flows virtually 
stagnated in real terms during the 1980s.
The debt crisis also had adverse consequences for multi­
lateral development finance. Some countries had no option 
but to build up arrears to the multilateral financing institu­
tions because of their acute debt problems, with the result 
that they are now denied access to further borrowing from 
these institutions. A number of donors have applied the same 
policy to countries which have accumulated arrears on their 
bilateral debt. By the late 1980s, net transfers from the 
World Bank to all developing countries had turned negative, 
especially those to the highly-indebted middle-income coun­
tries (HICs). This disappointing development was compoun­
ded by a similar evolution in International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) disbursements. Over the period 1986—88, annual net 
disbursements from the IMF to the HICs were a negative 
US$1.1 billion, reflecting difficulties encountered by major 
debtors in concluding arrangements with the IMF as well as 
repayments of large borrowing made during the early 1980s. 
However, the adverse impact of the debt crisis on financial 
flows was somewhat attenuated by the efforts made by the 
two institutions to raise additional funds particularly for 
debt-distressed sub-Saharan African countries.
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The debt crisis explains other important features that 
characterized development finance during the 1980s, namely 
debt rescheduling and adjustment lending. The debt pro­
blem became so pervasive that debt rescheduling, once an 
isolated, one-off mechanism designed to overcome temporary 
liquidity difficulties, became an entrenched problem of 
solvency within the international financial system. During the 
period 1986—88, as many as 72 developing countries incur­
red external payments arrears or concluded official or private 
debt rescheduling agreements. However, the traditional re­
scheduling techniques which prevailed until 1988 tended 
only to postpone and, in most cases, to amplify the debt 
problem. Recent policy initiatives — the Toronto Agreement 
on official debt relief and the Brady Plan for commercial 
bank debt — reflect an awareness of this weakness. While 
they embody measures designed to reduce the stock of debt, 
the financial benefits that have accrued to developing coun­
tries so far have been modest.
Capital flight was an additional factor that adversely 
affected external resource availability — in the 1980s. This 
phenomenon is a manifestation of financial disorder which I 
addressed in my first lecture and is again intimately linked to 
the debt-servicing difficulties experienced by developing 
countries. Capital flight is thus unlikely to be reversed in 
significant measure until a durable solution to the debt crisis 
begins to be applied.
Financing Development in the 1990s: Some Issues for 
Consideration
With the debt problems of several developing countries as yet 
unresolved, there is a disturbing prospect that the current 
decade may turn out to be little better than the 1980s. At 
the same time, it is clear that the revitalization of the deve-
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lopment process cannot await an end to the seemingly inter­
minable search for a durable solution to the debt crisis. While 
recent improvements in Paris Club practices and the 
strengthened.debt strategy initiated through the Brady Plan, 
have displayed considerable originality, strong doubts remain 
as to whether present approaches will yield the volume of 
debt and debt-service reduction necessary for a durable res­
toration of macroeconomic stability and growth.
For most of the developing countries, the financing of 
development must now look beyond the debt crisis. In this 
effort, particular importance attaches, first, to the need to 
increase very substantially both the volume and quality of 
official development finance, and second, to encouraging the 
contribution of private sources of non-debt capital to the 
financing of development. The potential contribution of 
private non-debt capital to the developing countries’ develop­
ment effort is far from being realized. Continuous attention 
needs to be directed towards improving the functioning of 
national financial and capital markets, as also towards putting 
in place and maintaining an appropriate set of incentives for 
domestic as well as foreign direct investment. However, these 
are essentially medium to long-term instruments. In the 
short-term, there is little alternative to continuing reliance on 
official sources of development finance.
The Prospects for Increasing Official Flows
The supply of external finance to developing countries — 
both official and private — will be influenced by the macro- 
economic policies of industrial countries and by the co-ordi­
nation of such policies. With regard to official development 
finance, the outlook is particularly bleak. Both concessional 
and non-concessional flows face unfavourable prospects, 
although for different reasons. According to the most recent
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OECD projections, ODA flows from all donors are expected 
to expand at an average annual rate of only about 2 per cent 
over the next few years. The global outcome is heavily depen­
dent on the projected rapid increase in Japan’s ODA and by 
the evolution of the US Aid Programme, which is expected to 
remain stable in nominal terms, at least in the near future.
Nevertheless, external aid flows will continue to be 
pivotal for a large number of poor developing countries, 
including the 41 countries in the least developed category, 
many of which are debt-distressed. The LDCs, the majority 
of which are located in Africa, are the weakest countries, 
with the least capacity for autonomous action, and private 
foreign investment cannot be expected to play a major role 
for some time. Projections of UNCTAD Secretariat indicate 
that the maintenance of recent trends in ODA flows and in 
the mobilization of domestic resources in the LDCs as a 
whole would result in the growth of their aggregate GDP by 
only 3 per cent per annum in the 1990s. This would barely 
exceed population growth.
In my view, a recovery scenario would require donors to 
double their present ODA to LDCs in the next five years and, 
as a longer-term endeavour, to aim at providing 0.20 per cent 
of their GNP as ODA to LDCs by the end of the 1990s. 
Moreover, to ensure complementarity between such interna­
tional support and national macroeconomic policies, a new 
and more flexible approach to structural adjustment pro­
grammes (SAP) should be developed taking into account the 
specific circumstances of each country, and the performance 
criteria applied to these countries will need to be reviewed. 
Debt relief should be truly additional and should focus on 
debt reduction. The LDCs should be eligible for the whole 
range of Toronto options for official debt and these should 
be made more concessional for these countries. Concessional 
relief should also be extended to multilateral debt, through, 
for instance, refinancing and interest subsidy arrangements
20
and to commercial bank debt through the provision of ade­
quate resources to support debt reduction and the greater 
involvement of creditor governments.
The broad retrenchment in the supply of funds from 
market-related sources inevitably focused attention on the 
role that multilateral financial institutions (MFIs) could play 
in financing adjustment and growth, especially in debt-dis­
tressed countries. However, the prospects for increasing 
multilateral concessional assistance to developing countries in 
the 1990s do not look encouraging. The amount recently 
agreed upon for the ninth IDA replenishment in the World 
Bank implies no increase in real terms over the resources of 
IDA-8. Yet, the worsened debt crisis, commodity price 
declines and the urgent need for further adjustment have con­
siderably raised recipients’ requirements. At the same time, 
stagnant IDA resources have to accommodate the needs of 
newly-eligible major countries such as Nigeria, and possibly 
Angola. Under this scenario, it is difficult to envisage how the 
financial needs of sub-Saharan Africa will be met. The World 
Bank has recently estimated that for that region to grow at 5 
per cent annually in the 1990s, ODA flows would have to ex­
pand at 4 per cent a year in real terms.
It is clear that if the multilateral financial institutions 
are to meet the challenges of the 1990s, they will have to be 
provided with adequate resources. The recently-agreed 50 per 
cent increase in the resources of the IMF is a step in the right 
direction — though it is 50 per cent below what the Fund 
management had originally sought three years ago and well 
below what most of its members would have supported. The 
Managing Director of t-he IMF himself had warned that a 
quota increase as low as 50 per cent could force the Fund to 
increase its borrowing. This rather timid response to a drama­
tic situation already appears to be inadequate. Not only have 
the financial needs of developing countries grown over the 
past three years but Eastern European countries have now
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emerged as legitimate claimants on the resources of the MFIs. 
In short, the question of providing the MFIs with adequate 
resources has not been resolved and, in the meantime, other 
channels will have to be explored.
Several practical possibilities exist for further 
strengthening the resources of the IMF and World Bank. 
First, it may be useful to examine the possibility of increa­
sing the resources of the F u n d ’s Structural Adjustment 
Facility (SAF) and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
Facility (ESAF) using not only voluntary contributions but 
also the proceeds from the sale of the IMF’s stock of gold. 
Such resources could also be used to assist poorer countries 
experiencing difficulties in meeting current repayments to 
MFIs, and who now risk suspension under the terms of the 
new quota agreement. Additional resources would also be re­
quired to enable the MFIs to engage in more meaningful debt 
reduction programmes — a precondition for a return to 
sustained growth in the heavily-indebted countries. Second, 
the question of an SDR increase should be given renewed 
consideration. The previous objection that an increase in 
SDRs would add to inflationary pressures in the world 
economy is no longer credible in the present period of con­
trolled inflation and steady growth in developed market-eco- 
nomy countries. Furthermore, the liquidity problems of 
developing countries are likely to become more acute as they 
seek to adjust to lower trade barriers in the wake of the 
Uruguay Round. Third, the time has come for the World 
Bank to give greater weight in its operations than has been 
the case for the past several years to its traditional role of 
financing development projects in developing countries. At 
30 per cent, its current level o f commitments for SPAs 
appears too high, especially at a time when project financing 
from other sources has virtually dried up. New emphasis on 
environmental protection and the role of the private sector 
raises the likelihood of a trade-off in the allocation of exist­
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ing resources between environmental protection and project 
development, as also between the public and private sectors. 
The resource requirements of the economies of Eastern 
Europe currently under reform could be substantial in both 
respects. Additional resources would have to be mobilized by 
the IBRD and IFC in order to avoid a diversion of resources 
to Eastern Europe at the expense of developing countries; 
such additional resources would also help to ensure that 
environmental considerations do not impose additional costs 
on developing countries.
In addition, the role that official institutions play in 
helping to mobilize funds available in private capital markets 
requires strengthening. The World Bank and regional develop­
ment banks were established, among other objectives, to 
mediate between private capital markets and developing 
countries. The rationale, broadly speaking, was that without 
such intermediation funds from private markets would not 
flow to developing countries in the volume that was both 
possible and desirable, and would not carry the terms, condi­
tions and other necessary characteristics of development 
finance. The recent experience of developing countries in 
seeking direct access to private markets validates this under­
lying rationale, and suggests the need for an expanded role 
for official intermediation.
Some recent developments are of particular interest in 
this regard. In order to meet the need to channel additional 
finance to Eastern Europe, for example, governments are well 
on the way to establishing the proposed European bank for 
reconstruction and development. The main purpose of this 
bank would be precisely to undertake intermediation bet­
ween private capital markets and ultimate borrowers. It is 
indeed the case that private capital is unlikely to flow in 
sufficient volume to countries that are heavily indebted and 
whose current economic performance is mediocre or even 
poor, even when those countries are undertaking vigorous
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efforts at adjustment and reform. This is just as true for 
countries in say Latin America, as it is for countries in 
Eastern Europe. This underlines the importance of enhancing 
the capacity of international financial institutions across the 
board to engage in financial intermediation.
Mention should also be made of individual national 
efforts to intermediate funds flowing through private capital 
markets. Some of the mechanisms recently put in place in 
Japan, for example, are worthy of note. Japanese attempts to 
recycle funds to developing countries rely extensively on 
hybrid flows i.e., joint financing arranged by the government 
in collaboration with the private sector. In these arrange­
ments, private institutions raise funding while public institu­
tions serve as intermediaries to reduce the risk of channelling 
funds for investment projects in developing countries. 
Government resources are used mainly to provide some form 
of appropriate guarantee and, particularly in the case of low- 
jncome countries, to provide an interest subsidy. This Japa­
nese recycling technique has proven to be an effective instru­
ment which other surplus countries, especially the Federal 
Republic of Germany, might usefully adapt.
Finally, the ending of the Cold War, which is unfolding 
hand in hand with the process of reform in Eastern Europe, 
promises to open opportunities for drastically scaling down 
military expenditures. The so-called peace dividend should 
make it possible for some important donor countries, such as 
the USA, to better meet their own social and other needs as 
well as to support the process of economic transformation in 
both Eastern European and developing countries. The transla­
tion into reality of this once-in-a-lifetime opportunity calls 
for statesmanship of the highest order.
An Expanded Role for Private Flows
In the 1960s and 1970s, concern over ownership and control
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of capital encouraged a misplaced emphasis on general obliga­
tion borrowing by developing countries where the borrower 
retained maximum risks as well as rewards. Since the onset of 
the debt crisis, the prevailing policy view has been that the 
role of equity and quasi-equity finance should be expanded, 
both to redress the imbalance between debt-creating and non­
debt-creating flows and to compensate in part for the sharp 
decline in commercial bank lending. Encouraged by interna­
tional financial institutions and bilateral donors, many deve­
loping countries have made great efforts to attract foreign 
direct investment flows through the liberalization of invest­
ment regimes, the introduction of new incentives and the set­
ting up of schemes aimed at the conversion of debt into 
equity. Despite this improved receptivity, however, the re­
sults have been meagre. Although FDI flows have recovered 
in the last few years from the trough registered in 1985, by 
1988 their volume in real terms was about half the peak level 
of 1981. The recovery was largely concentrated in Asian 
countries with low external debt profiles and in a few Latin 
American countries under the impetus of major debt-equity 
swap programmes. Nevertheless, the evolution of new techni­
ques such as joint ventures, production and profit-sharing 
arrangements, licencing agreements etc., has opened up new 
possibilities for FDI.
Portfolio investment in equities is another valuable 
source of non-debt-creating finance that remains largely un­
derutilized by developing countries. At the end of 1989, the 
pool of institutional and other funds held by institutions in 
the main markets of the United States of America, Europe 
and Japan was estimated at about US$7.5 trillion and was 
growing at about 15 per cent a year. However, the flow of 
portfolio investment to developing countries is insignificant 
and concentrated mainly on a few markets in Asia. The limi­
ted number of existing capital markets and restricted trading 
activity in developing countries would have to be rapidly ex­
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panded if they were to succeed in attracting a modest propor­
tion of these rapidly-growing portfolio resources. While the 
potential for growth is enormous, the further development of 
equity markets in developing countries requires a combina­
tion of measures ranging from the relaxation of barriers to 
market entry and related regulatory provisions, to financial 
and technical assistance to support the opening of new 
markets and to strengthen existing ones. I PC’s emerging Mar­
kets Fund established in 1986 has played a pioneering role in 
this respect. However, some observers feel that this role 
should be expanded by increasing IP'C’s investments in dome­
stic financial institutions in developing countries and enlar­
ging its technical assistance role funded by transfers from the 
World Bank. Similarly, the decision by Commonwealth 
Finance Ministers in September 1989 to establish a Common­
wealth Equity Fund will further strengthen the flow of 
investment resources to developing countries and provide 
developing countries with an additional incentive to establish 
new or modernize existing capital markets.
Likewise, the use of asset-backed financing techniques 
such as commodity-linked bonds, where returns are related to 
the commodity’s price, hold out interesting possibilities for 
commodity-dependent developing countries. Though asset- 
backed financing techniques using commodities may be in 
their infancy, the principle is not new. Commodities such as 
petroleum, precious metals, minerals, etc. that generate a 
flow of income can be used to back the issue of long-term 
government securities, the repayment of which is directly re­
lated to their current market value. This implies additional 
effort to improve commodity-price risk management. In 
1989, the World Bank initiated a technical development pro- 
- gramme to assist developing countries in using international 
financial markets for commodity finance and risk manage­
ment. The time may also be ripe to expand the role of non­
resource project financing in which risks and responsibilities
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are shared with foreign investors by linking borrowing to a 
related enterprise or project without a general guarantee.
Concluding Observations
Financing development in the 1990s will depend not only on 
the flow of external resources but also on developing coun­
tries’ ability to increase their export earnings substantially. 
At a time when attention is focused on ways of reducing 
their burden of external debt, it is well to recall that, in real 
terms, the prices of the principal commodity exports of deve­
loping countries have fallen by 20 per cent and earnings by 
one-third since the early 1980s. As a result, developing 
countries have lost over US$120 billion in real export earn­
ings from commodities, not counting petroleum — a sum 
that would, if it had materialized, have made a considerable 
difference to their need for external assistance and their deve­
lopment performance. This is, therefore, another area which 
calls for new and bolder initiatives by the international com­
munity in the 1990s.
One of the main obstacles to increasing developing 
countries’ exports relates to market access. Tariff levels in the 
developed market-economy countries continue to be higher 
on products of interest to developing countries than on other 
imports, and tariff escalation in step with the degree of pro­
cessing also remains a handicap. The most serious impedi­
ment to market access, however, has been the proliferation of 
non-tariff barriers, which currently affect almost 30 per 
cent of the exports of developing countries to the developed 
market economies. In sectors of particular export interest to 
developing countries (especially textiles, clothing and steel), 
the proportion of affected trade has ranged between one half 
and three quarters. This background clearly points to the 
importance of achieving a balanced outcome to the Uruguay
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Round which fully accommodates the priorities and objec­
tives of the developing countries.
At the national level, the mobilization of domestic 
savings, the maintenance of sound macroeconomic policies 
and the fostering of an attractive investment climate are all 
areas for policy action, the need for which cannot be over­
emphasized. In these as in other areas, developing countries 
must themselves take appropriate action in fulfilment of their 
primary responsibility for their own development. The opti­
mal utilization of limited financial resources must receive 
closer attention by policy-makers.
In conclusion, let me say that though the financing of 
development in the 1990s presents formidable challenges for 
the international community, and the developing countries in 
particular, meeting these challenges is not beyond the realm 
of possibility. It should not be forgo teen that, in today ’s 
interdependent world, all countries stand to benefit from a 
revitalization of growth and development in the developing 
countries.
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Lecture 3
THE WORLD COMMODITY ECONOMY: COUNTERING 
INSTABILITY AND PROMOTING DIVERSIFICATION
Introduction
One of the main distinguishing features of developing coun­
tries is their high degree of dependence on foreign technolo­
gies, expertise and markets. For the many developing coun­
tries which rely on a few commodities for most of their export 
earnings, this amounts to an unacceptable vulnerability to 
factors beyond their control. In the current external environ­
ment, generally unfavourable for development and holding 
out little promise of improvement, particularly in so far as 
external financial flows are concerned, it is more than ever 
necessary for them to devise measures to counter this vulne­
rability, especially through the diversification of commodity- 
dependent economies.
In the period 1982-1986, 50 out of 84 developing coun­
tries depended on one or two commodities for over half of 
their export earnings. Twenty-eight out of 41 African coun­
tries were in this position. Particularly important for Africa 
were petroleum, coffee, cocoa and cotton; four countries 
depend for over half of their export earnings on coffee alone, 
and one on cocoa. For such countries, the outlook for deve­
lopment in the 1990s clearly depends on the outlook for the 
commodity economy and, more so, on the prospects for 
diversification.
The dependence on a limited number of  commodities is 
dangerous for several reasons. First, commodity production is 
often highly volatile, depending on factors like weather con­
ditions or input shortages due to a lack of foreign exchange, 
which are hard to control. Second, world market prices fluc­
tuate strongly. There is rarely a balance between supply and 
demand: whereas demand is relatively stable, supply tends to 
vary significantly in the short run. To give some examples, 
during the period 19801989, sugar prices varied, on average, 
89 per cent a year from their trend. Rice prices varied 28 per 
cent, aluminium prices 33 per cent, and cocoa prices 14 per
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cent. To indicate what this means: for the period 1980— 
1987, commodity export earnings made up one-fifth of total 
gross domestic production of sub-Saharan Africa. A 10 per 
cent reduction in these earnings, then — and the data 
mentioned earlier on commodity dependence indicate this is 
well within the range of probability — would reduce the GDP 
growth rate by about two percentage points.
High commodity dependence also causes a large variabi­
lity of export earnings as well as of government and personal 
incomes. This makes government planning very difficult, 
endangers import capacity, thus causing hardships for local 
industry, and undermines the economic stability of develo­
ping countries. And economic instability gives rise to social 
and political problems.
The international community, recognizing these charac­
teristics and problems o f  commodity markets and develop­
ing countries, has been actively seeking to ameliorate the 
situation for a long time: first, through various instruments 
involving consumer-producer co-operation including Interna­
tional Commodity Agreements to reduce the instability of 
world market commodity prices and to improve the function­
ing of commodity markets; second, through the provision of 
compensatory finance partially to cover export earnings 
shortfalls; third, and more fundamental, by promoting the 
diversification of the export structure of developing coun­
tries. These then are the two themes I would like to develop 
in this lecture.
International Commodity Agreements and other Arrange­
ments for Producer-Consumer Co-operation
International commodity agreements are a means of impro­
ving the functioning of commodity markets. When the adjust­
ment process towards a balance of supply and demand is defi­
cient or slow for a commodity, and thus creates high costs to
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producers and consumers, a commodity agreement can 
reduce the costs involved in such an adjustment. This can be 
done through at least two different kinds of activities. First, 
action can be taken to increase the stability of world market 
prices by negotiating a price stabilization agreement based on 
export quotas, a buffer stock, or a combination of the two. 
Examples of such commodity agreements have been those for 
sugar, coffee, cocoa, tin and natural rubber. These agree­
ments have, for shorter or longer periods, dampened price 
movements on international markets, and have thus been, 
and can continue to be, depending on the circumstances of 
each case, of importance to producers and consumers of 
these commodities.
Price stabilizing commodity agreements with effective 
economic provisions are, however, difficult to negotiate and 
to implement. Both consumers and producers have to feel 
committed; such commitment is often not present. If coun­
tries perceive their short-term national interest to be different 
from the objectives of an agreement, they often choose to 
pursue these short-term interests, frequently to their own 
long-term detriment. Unfortunately, producers often perceive 
an interest in a commodity agreement when prices are falling, 
and prefer to depend on the market when prices are rising. 
For consumers, the opposite is true. It is, therefore, no sur­
prise that consumer disagreements over price ranges or size of 
stocks and/or quotas are frequent. Supply management by 
producers, and as necessary with the co-operation of consu­
mers, could open up far-reaching possibilities especially in 
times of oversupply. If supply could thus be brought into 
better balance with demand, the prices of many primary pro­
ducts could be improved, and production and exports more 
effectively rationalized. However, for several important com­
modities, the large number of countries involved in exporting 
makes this difficult. Recently, interest in supply management 
among commodity-exporting developing countries has been
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revived, and some progress in this direction may be possible 
in the future.
For commodity agreements with buffer stock arrange­
ments, the First Account of the Common Fund for Commo­
dities, when it becomes operational, can be of assistance as a 
source of supplementary financing. The Common Fund, as a 
whole, has recently entered into force, but only its Second 
Account, which is designed to support commodity develop­
mental-activities, is set to begin operations. It is to be hoped 
that, despite changing circumstances, both Accounts will be 
enabled to play a useful role in the future. Unfortunately, 
there is at the moment only one commodity agreement with 
functioning price provisions, that for natural rubber. The 
economic provisions of both the Cocoa Agreement and the 
Coffee Agreement, which are of great importance for Africa, 
have ceased to be operational in the recent past.
In the case of cocoa, the price range to be defended by 
the buffer stock has proved to be a major difficulty. Despite 
semi-automatic adjustment mechanisms to adapt the price 
range to changing market conditions, disagreement on this 
question resulted in the virtual collapse of the latest Cocoa 
Agreement in early 1988. With the buffer stock almost full, 
it was not possible to reach agreement on the introduction 
of supplementary measures, while cocoa producers outside 
the Agreement continued to make considerable sales. 
Between the start of 1988 and 1990, cocoa prices fell by 
almost one-half. Since then, however, considerable progress 
towards international co-operation has been made. At a 
session of the International Cocoa Council last March, it was 
decided to extend the Agreement for a period of two years, 
without economic provisions but effectively freezing the 
buffer stock. Moreover, Malaysia attended meetings of the 
cocoa producers’ group in the Cocoa Council and has 
announced that it is joining the Cocoa Producers’ Alliance. 
Since the March agreement, cocoa prices have risen by one-
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third.
For coffee, an international commodity agreement has 
in the past effectively reduced market instability and main­
tained price levels through the use of an export quota 
scheme, rather than through buffer stocking. However, the 
difficulties experienced in reaching a satisfactory distribution 
of quotas and the dissatisfaction of consumers with the exis­
tence of a two-tier market (permitting non-members to make 
purchases at a considerable discount) and with the effect of 
quotas on the availability of different grades of coffee, led to 
the collapse of the Agreement in July 1989. After the suspen­
sion of export quotas, prices dropped by 40 per cent within a 
few months. There have been several initiatives undertaken to 
revive producer-consumer co-operation on coffee and it is to 
be hoped that the coffee agreement can be renegotiated in 
the near future. UNCTAD, for its part, is committed to pro­
moting this objective.
The second important activity which commodity agree­
ments can undertake but which can also be pursued in the 
context of other forms of producer-consumer co-operation, 
is the improvement of market transparency through exchange 
of information on markets and policies^ and the carrying out 
of research on structural and technological change, competi­
tion with synthetics and substitutes, new end-uses, environ­
mental issues and trends in capital investment. A related 
activity is the monitoring and review of market development's 
and prospects including the effects of domestic policies affec­
ting production and pricing. Likewise, considerable potential 
exists for the elaboration, in the context of produccr-consu- 
mer co-operation, of programmes and projects in such areas 
as research and development, productivity improvement, 
market promotion and vertical and horizontal diversification. 
The Second Account of the Common Fund for Commodities, 
once it is fully operational, can make funds available to com­
modity bodies in support of such programmes and projects.
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Two Commodity Agreements which concentrate on these 
activities have been negotiated in the framework of UNCTAD 
during the last few years, i.e., those for jute and jute products 
and for tropical timber. For several minerals, more informal 
groups, with an emphasis on the exchange of information and 
statistics, are operative, some of which are within the
UNCTAD framework. These activities can help to increase 
the benefits developing countries reap from their export 
activities.
Price stabilizing commodity agreements are not, of 
course, feasible for all commodities, and besides they only 
act on international prices; they do not necessarily stabilize 
the foreign exchange earnings of commodity-exporting coun­
tries. To reach this goal, we must have recourse to another 
mechanism, namely compensatory financing. Most compensa­
tory finance is provided through a facility in the Interna­
tional Monetary Fund. However, its effects have been limi­
ted. Funds are made available on market-related terms, with a 
relatively-short period for reimbursement, and only to coun­
tries either with no balance-of-payments problems ether than 
the shortfall, or to those with such problems who agree with 
the Fund on the adjustment measures to be undertaken. IMF 
conditions are often rather stringent, and have become more 
so in the 1980s. As an indication, in 1989 only three coun­
tries made a drawing under the compensatory financing com­
ponent of the facility, whereas in the late 1970s and early 
1980s up to 20 drawings a year were made.
There are also other, smaller-commodity-related 
schemes: the Stabex facility, created as part of the EEC-ACP 
Lomd Convention, the EEC scheme for non-ACP least develo­
ped countries, and the comparable programme recently intro­
duced by Switzerland. These supply financing in the form of 
grants for shortfalls in earnings from specific agricultural 
commodities exported to the EEC and Switzerland, and con­
tribute to easing the commodity instability problem because
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the funds are used in the sector suffering from the shortfall 
or for diversification. Within UNCTAD, the Committee on 
Commodities is to review existing compensatory financing 
mechanisms and their implications for the development of 
developing countries at its November 1990 session.
Diversification
Let me now turn to the subject of diversification. As 1 said 
earlier, price stabilization and compensatory finance can miti­
gate the negative effects of the commodity export depen­
dence of developing countries, but they cannot solve the pro­
blem. This objective can only be attained through diversifica­
tion. Affected countries need to develop new export 
products, stimulate the processing of commodities before 
exporting them, and increase their participation in, and 
returns from, the marketing and distribution of their exports.
Export diversification is an essential part of economic 
development. It is no coincidence that the five least develo­
ped countries which had a per capita growth of over six per­
cent during the 1980s all now depend on non-traditional 
exports as the main source of foreign exchange earnings. 
These countries have begun to find a special niche in the 
international economy; other countries deserve support to 
discover as well how they can diversify their economies so as 
to achieve higher economic growth.
The international community has long recognized the 
crucial role of diversification. So far, however, the record of 
developing countries in the area of export diversification has 
been meagre. Over the period 1967—1986, two-thirds of die 
developing countries showed either little change or even an 
increase in their dependence on one or two commodities. In 
sub-Saharan Africa, only four countries showed a reduced 
dependence on their major export commodities and alas, two
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of these did so because of large setbacks in production.
Nevertheless, the scope for diversification is large, l-'or 
instance, developing countries account for almost all world 
exports of cocoa; but their share in world exports of proces­
sed cocoa products is only 26 per cent, and their share in the 
export of chocolate a mere 5 per cent. Over three quarters of 
bauxite traded on the world market comes from developing 
countries; their share in world exports of aluminium, how­
ever, is less than a quarter.
Many possibilities exist also for increasing the participa­
tion of developing-country firms in the marketing of their 
export products. At present, for many commodities this pro­
fitable activity is almost exclusively in the hands of transna­
tional enterprises. Because such firms tend to control distri­
bution networks, increased involvement by the producer 
countries in marketing will not be easy, but possibilities do 
exist. These need to be supported through exchanges of 
experiences among developing countries on policies and 
measures to encourage marketing activities, and through 
appropriate human resource development and increased 
market transparency.
Broadening the gamut of exported commodities is 
another option. Here, however, some caution is necessary. 
For many countries, new products are likely to be the tradi­
tional exports for other countries. For most traditional com­
modity exports of developing countries, the elasticity of 
demand is quite low, and larger volumes entering world 
markets are likely to depress prices. Even if one country 
gains, others might lose. While non-traditional commodities, 
like fresh vegetables, tropical frulFs or cut flowers offer some­
what better prospects, markets for them are small compared 
to those for, say, coffee or cocoa; they are also highly pro­
duct differentiated and spatially segmented and will quickly 
be saturated if many developing countries start exporting the 
same products.
38
Diversification, especially in terms of new products or 
the provision of marketing services, does not usually happen 
spontaneously. Active, supportive intervention by govern­
ments, foreign aid donors and the international community is 
necessary. A concerted effort by all parties involved is 
needed, as a whole set of conditions has to be met in order to 
make the diversification process viable.
Of course, not all countries have the same possibilities. 
Some are better endowed with raw materials than others. 
Some are landlocked, others have easier access to the world 
market. Some have large populations with a reasonable per 
capita income, for others the absorption capacity of the local 
market is far smaller and unlikely to provide a base for diver­
sified outputs. But all countries have the possibility to stimu­
late diversification, be it on their own or within a regional 
framework. In this context there are several crucial elements 
which need to be considered. First, governments should 
identify diversification opportunities, including those with 
export potential, and design appropriate supportive policies. 
Moreover, information on export-oriented diversification 
possibilities should be transmitted to the private sector, 
especially the local small-scale entrepreneurs who do not have 
easy access to information on export markets.
Second, governments have a responsibility for providing 
the basic infrastructure necessary for the diversification of 
the economy. This includes not only the construction and 
maintenance of roads, ports, storage facilities, irrigation works, 
etc. but also telecommunication facilities. Especially when 
exports are to be diversified or when increased participation 
in marketing is envisaged, the existence of a good telecommu­
nications network linked with overseas markets is indispensa­
ble. Experience in different countries shows that a deficient 
infrastructure has a negative impact on diversification, 
hindering both the introduction of non-traditional products 
and the processing of commodities. Macroeconomic and
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incentive policies, including getting the prices right and 
liberalizing market structures, which have received much 
attention during the last few years are indeed important. 
However, without these other infrastructural elements, they 
alone are not sufficient.
Third, human resource development is crucial. Entrepre­
neurs need a whole set o f managerial, technical and market­
ing skills to function well; moreover, an adequate level of 
general education of the labour force is necessary. Since 
external markets are becoming increasingly competitive with 
stiff requirements in terms of quality standards and promo­
ting product differentiation, increasing marketing skills is of 
extreme importance.
Fourth, the existence of highly competitive markets 
implies an emphasis on up-to-date research and development. 
This, along with the need to adapt technologies to local con­
ditions implies support for institutions and local universities 
to undertake these tasks.
Fifth, governments have to tackle the problem of access 
to credit by entrepreneurs, especially those in small-scale 
industries. Small entrepreneurs in developing countries have 
always had problems in obtaining credit, and this situation 
is now compounded in many countries by the credit ceilings 
imposed by the International Monetary Fund. A way has to 
be found around this problem, otherwise a take-off of local 
industry is very unlikely. The supply of credit lines and loans 
to local development banks for onlending is being used as 
part of the solution, but the conditions these banks impose 
are often discouraging for small scale entrepreneurs. New 
actions in this area are already underway, even though their 
scope is as yet limited: the International Finance Corporation 
and the African Development Bank, for instance, have 
recently started programmes to support local entrepreneurs. 
The operation of facilities such as the Centre for the Develop­
ment of Industry, which is part of the framework of EEC-
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AGP co-operation and geared to small scale projects, is 
another interesting approach.
International Support for Diversification
Increased support actions by the international community 
are also necessary. Specifically, the markets of industrial 
countries have to be made more accessible to developing 
countries’ products, and world commodity markets made 
more transparent. Action is needed in the areas of tariffs, 
non-tariff barriers, restrictive business practices, and die 
access of developing countries to the necessary market infor­
mation, as well as to information that would facilitate invest­
ment decisions and to training facilities in a wide range of 
areas.
Trade restrictions are an important barrier to trade for 
manv agricultural products; many developed countries use 
these to- protect their own agricultural production and their 
local industries. It is also significant that tariffs in developed 
countries escalate with the degree of processing embodied in 
imports from developing countries. For instance, die tariff 
applied by the European Community for imports under the 
Generalized System of Preferences is 6.5 per cent for raw 
coffee, the tariff on ground coffee 12 per cent; and while 
there is no tariff on cocoa beans, there is a tariff of 11 per 
cent on cocoa paste. This tariff escalation, o f course, makes 
local processing in developing countries before export less 
attractive.
AGP countries currently face relatively low tariffs com­
pared to non-AGP countries in the EEC under the Lom^ Con­
vention. On the other hand, their exports are considerably 
affected by non-tariff measures, such as quantitative restric­
tions, internal taxes, voluntary export restraints, seasonal 
tariffs and health and sanitary requirements. Experience
41
shows that market access conditions are generally important. 
It also shows that a few developing countries have succeeded 
in diversifying exports despite high market barriers, whereas 
many others, facing the same, and in some cases lower 
barriers, have not. The determinants of such differential 
growth and development experiences among developing 
countries have been explored in my first lecture.
Restrictive business practices, used by enterprises to 
strengthen their position in a given market, are quite com­
mon in international trade, especially trade in commodities. 
For instance, sugarcane exporters have found themselves 
obliged to deliver to a single group of firms around 90 per 
cent of the cane sugar which they were permitted to sell in 
the European Community. Another example: the practice 
of aggressive brand-name promoting in the developed coun­
tries’ markets for chocolate by a few large enterprises has 
made new entry into these markets almost prohibitively 
expensive.
Developing countries have few independent sources of 
information on markets. For most commodity markets, this 
information is in the hands of the large trading companies. 
This reduces the bargaining power countries have when con­
fronted with these trading companies, and moreover makes it 
very difficult for them to penetrate markets by themselves. 
The usual solution is to enter into a joint venture with the 
foreign partner handling the export marketing. However, 
improvement of information flows in an accessible and usable 
form at a reasonable cost is an area where international co­
operation can be helpful.
The international community should also be involved in 
making sure that adequate financial resources are available 
for diversification purposes, including multilateral, bilateral 
and private sources of funds. Only a small percentage of 
multilateral funds has actually been devoted to diversification 
projects over the last decade, and so a more focussed effort
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is needed in this direction, particularly for countries which 
remain highly dependent on the export of a few primary 
commodities.
International assistance can also be crucial in the formu­
lation of diversification programmes. This would include 
assistance in assessing the potential of the commodity sector 
in terms of resource endowments and domestic demand, its 
interaction with other sectors, institutional requirements, 
incentives and support requirements of the main economic 
agents, as well as external factors, such as world market pros­
pects.
Within UNCTAD, the international community has been 
devoting serious attention to these matters. Intensive inter­
governmental dialogue has been under way on issues and 
areas for international co-operation in the field of diversifica­
tion, including processing, marketing and distribution. In 
addition, the UNCTAD secretariat has been actively engaged 
in collecting, analyzing and identifying gaps in existing tech­
nical assistance for diversification; in executing technical co­
operation projects in such areas as support to developing 
countries in the context of the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations; in providing support for enhancing commerciali­
zation policies of developing countries’ products; and in 
developing an international programme of assistance to 
increase local processing in developing countries.
While diversification decisions are primarily the respon­
sibility of developing countries themselves, the international 
community does have the obligation to assist in the process 
both by making the trading environment as fair and open as 
possible, and by ensuring access to the necessary complemen­
tary components of finance, information and technical assis­
tance. This conclusion leads to the broader question of the 
need for appropriate systemic arrangements designed to 
reflect and accommodate the new realities of the world 
economy and the changing needs of the weaker countries.
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Lecture 4
SYSTEMIC ISSUES IN TRADE, MONEY AND FINANCE 
AND EVOLVING ROLE OF UNCTAD
Introduction
In this last lecture, I would like to address some issues rela­
ting to the institutional framework of international economic 
relations and the role of UNCTAD in die development co­
operation dialogue.
In response to the development crisis of the 1980s, 
most developing countries have undertaken a substantial 
reappraisal of their development strategies and policies. This 
has led to an increased awareness of the limitations of centra­
lized planning systems and of over-reliance on import-substi­
tution-based industrialization. Many of these countries are 
now pursuing far-reaching macroeconomic policy reforms 
designed to promote both price stability and a viable external 
balance, to improve the flexibility of their economies and to 
achieve greater responsiveness to changes in the external 
environment. Trade policy' reforms are also being widely 
introduced, involving a combination of reductions in non­
tariff import barriers and in the level, as well as in the disper­
sion of tariffs, currency devaluation, and heavier reliance on 
the exchange rate as a balance of payments equilibrating 
mechanism-.
These efforts will, however, have little chance of success 
without a conducive external environment, in particular a 
supportive regime governing international trade, monetary and 
financial relations. The influence of the external environment 
stems, of course, from the mainly one-sided dependence of 
developing countries on the developed world for external 
trade and finance. This dependence, which is itself a manifes­
tation of underdevelopment, persists in the context of grow­
ing interlinkages among national economies generally through 
trade, investment, technology and financial flows.
Such interlinkages have given rise to growing interdepen­
dence within the world economy and have enhanced the 
potential for the transmission of both expansionary and con­
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tractionary influences across the world economy. In effect, 
interdependence is serving increasingly as a vehicle for the 
transmission of impulses: either in a positive sense towards 
broad-based growth and development, or negatively towards 
serious imbalances, wider instability, and stagnation or regres­
sion in the developing world. For these reasons, the function­
ing of the international trading, monetary and financial 
systems has become an important factor affecting the health 
of the world economy and the aspirations of the developing 
world.
How the interlinkages among different economies and 
the interrelationships between problems and policies in the 
areas of trade, money, finance and development are managed 
and, in that context, how the institutional framework of 
international economic relations evolves in the period ahead 
will greatly influence the outlook for development in the 
1990s and beyond. It is in this perspective that the present 
lecture will focus on some basic aspects of the functioning of 
the international trading, monetary and financial systems.
The need to improve the functioning of the interna­
tional trading, monetary and financial systems is now widely 
recognized. While approaches to this objective differ very 
widely, their viability depends on the extent to which they 
meet the number of requirements. They must be directly 
supportive of the efforts of the developing countries to carry 
out adjustments and corrections in their economies condu­
cive to an adequate tempo of growth. They must be suppor­
tive also of the efforts of the developed market economies 
and other countries in transition to achieve better macro- 
economic management and structural adjustment. And they 
must provide for the equitable participation of all countries 
in the relevant decision-making processes.
International Trading System
As regards the trading system, three sets of issues need to be
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addressed. The first concerns the inherent limitations of the 
existing system in dealing with a wide range of trade policy 
issues and trade relations between developed and developing 
countries. The second set has to do with certain adverse 
tendencies in the operation of the system. And the third con­
cerns developments which are outside the field of trade 
policy but affect the functioning of the trading system.
The inherent limitations of the trading system stem 
partly from the priorities that were built into the Bretton 
Woods system for international economic co-operation 
established in the wake of the Second World War. That 
system was envisaged as a pattern of mutually-supportive 
institutional arrangements involving the International Mone­
tary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruc­
tion and Development (IBRD); and a trading system which 
was to be administered by a comprehensive International 
Trade Organization (ITO). In the conception of these institu­
tional arrangements, the primary concern was to prevent a 
repetition o f  the economic problems experienced by the 
industrialized countries during the inter-war period. These 
arrangements thus reflected, in the main, the viewpoints and 
priorities of the industrialized countries. Most developing 
countries, not having yet attained independence, had little 
say in the matter. Consequently, development did not figure 
as a major objective in the design of these arrangements.
The limitations of the trading system also derive from 
the failure of the planned International Trade Organization 
to materialize; in the event, only the commercial chapter of 
the Havana Charter for the ITO came into effect, leading to 
the establishment of GATT as an interim arrangement. In 
consequence, issues covered by the Havana Charter but which 
remained outside the purview of the GATT, particularly 
commodity price stabilization, economic development 
measures, restrictive business practices and macroeconomic 
policies, have been pursued within United Nations forums,
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notably UNCTAD, and in die OECD among developed 
market economy countries. Nevertheless, the exclusion of 
these areas of trade relations from die mutual rights and 
obligations of the trading system has remained an important 
limitation of the trading system.
Since the establishment of the GATT, attempts have 
naturally been made to make the multilateral trading system 
more consistent with the needs o f  developing countries. 
These include the incorporation of a provision into die 
General Agreement in 1957 to permit developing countries 
to take protective action, including quantitative restrictions 
for infant industry and balance of payment purposes; the 
establishment of the generalized system of preferences (GSP), 
negotiated in UNCTAD and perhaps the most important 
manifestation of the international consensus of the 1960s 
and 1970s on these matters: namely that trade policy action 
should be taken by the industrialized countries to promote 
the growth and development of the developing countries; the 
incorporation of Part IV on “Trade and Development” into 
GATT, signifying the acceptance of the principle diat 
developed countries did not expect reciprocity from develop­
ing countries in trade negotiations. However, these measures 
in favour of developing countries are either non-contractual 
or are heavily qualified, and the derogations permitted to 
developing countries are generally subject to strict surveil­
lance.
Thus, the GATT-based trading system has, from its 
inception, embodied some fundamental inadequacies. What is 
more, its evolution has been characterized by a steady 
erosion of certain of its basic principles, in particular the 
MFN principle. Also prominent over the past decade have 
been increased tendencies towards managed trade, a gradual 
retreat from multilateralism in favour of regional, bilateral 
and unilateral approaches and an increasing reliance on the 
exercise of economic weight rather than the observance of
50
agreed rules of international trade policy. In addition, there 
has been a strong trend towards the increased use of non­
tariff protective trade measures of a discretionary character. 
These measures, which according to the initiating countries, 
are designed to shield domestic producers from external 
shocks, either fall outside the jurisdiction of the GATT or 
involve derogations from GATT rules, as in the case of the 
Multifibre Arrangement (MFA;.
Over the years the tariff-based trade liberalization 
process has, of course, been actively pursued, but it has been 
concentrated in sectors characterized by a horizontal division 
of labour among developed market-economy countries. The 
escalation of tariff rates in step with the degree of processing 
has persisted, and the liberalization process has encountered 
strong resistance in certain sectors, notably agriculture, 
textiles, clothing, footwear and other leather goods — sectors 
in which developing countries have a distinct comparative 
advantage. Some observers have suggested that lack of parti­
cipation by developing countries in trade negotiations on the 
basis of reciprocity has been the main reason for the exclu­
sion from the trade liberalization process of sectors in which 
they have a particular interest. Others have argued, however, 
that the interests of transnational corporations (TNCs) have 
played a dominant role in this process; as a result, liberaliza­
tion has been concentrated in areas of interest to them, and 
has tended to prom ote their freedom of action, particularly 
as such intra-firm trade is not governed by G A IT  rules.
The evolution and operation of the trade regime has also 
been influenced by developments outside the field of trade 
policy, especially shifts in macroeconomic objectives in 
developed market-economy countries and the breakdown of 
the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. Since the 
late 1970s, the preoccupations of many developed market- 
economy countries have given less weight to promoting 
growth and employment than to controlling inflation. At the
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same time, the fear of unemployment in particular sectors 
has remained an important factor in trade policy and has 
been a major impulse behind recent protectionist initiatives 
in these countries. Finally, sharp movements in real effective 
exchange rates and large currency misalignments, which also 
weaken the effectiveness of tariffs as a protective mechanism, 
have contributed to the prevalence of managed trade and the 
proliferation of non-tariff protectionist measures.
Proposals have recently been advanced by some develo­
ped countries for the establishment of an international trade 
organization. The stated objective of such proposals is to 
provide a stronger institutional basis to the GATT, to con­
solidate and integrate the results of the Uruguay Round, in 
particular in new areas, to reduce the risks of unilateral 
enforcement procedures (such as are contained in Article 301 
of the US Trade Law) and to evolve comprehensive multila­
teral dispute settlement procedures for all relevant multila­
teral instruments.
The existence of such proposals is a reminder of the 
incompleteness of institutional arrangements for dealing w th  
problems of international trade. It would, indeed, be 
welcome if the international community, through the United 
Nations, were to agree, in a new wave of commitment to 
multilateralism, to work towards an international trade 
organization which would be comprehensive in subject 
coverage, universal in membership, based on agreed objectives 
and norms of behaviour, responsive to the interests of all its 
members, equitable in decision-making and organically linked 
to related institutional arrangements in the areas of money 
and finance. It is to be hoped that this ambitious aim will be 
kept firmly in view in current discussions and that the 
possible establishment of new institutional mechanisms in the 
area of trade will be seen not in relation to the specific 
negotiating process of the Uruguay Round but in this wider 
perspective.
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An efficient and equitable trading system would need to be 
underpinned by a stable and supportive international mone­
tary and financial system. Over the past two decades, how­
ever, the effectiveness of the international monetary and 
financial system in providing stable conditions for world 
trade has weakened significantly. The unfavourable environ­
ment for developing countries with regard to the external 
financing of development, which I addressed in my second 
lecture, together with inadequacies in the functioning of the 
international monetary and financial system itself has 
impeded the adjustment efforts of many developing countries 
and has been a constraint on the growth potential of these 
countries. Thus, from the perspective of growth and develop­
ment in the 1990s, an urgent need arises for the international 
community to tackle more vigorously a number of basic 
interrelated issues concerning the functioning of the interna­
tional financial and monetary system.
The first set of issues has to do with the external finan­
cing needs of developing countries. These have already been 
examined in my second lecture. In the present context, one 
point to emphasize is that the experience of the 1980s has 
underlined the severe limitations of an approach which relies 
heavily on private commercial flows. The need for stronger 
efforts by developing countries to mobilize domestic savings 
and to create favourable conditions for foreign investment is 
self-evident. But external flows will continue to be pivotal for 
a large number of these countries. In order to help ensure 
that such flows are available on appropriate terms and condi­
tions, the international financial institutions will have to 
assume a much larger role, direct and indirect, in meeting the 
requirements for development finance and they will need to 
be provided with substantial new resources.
Another potentially-important source of capital for 
developing countries could be the surplus developed coun­
International Monetary and Financial Framework
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tries. In addition to their own bilateral recycling mechanisms, 
these surplus countries could channel resources through the 
multilateral financial institutions for the purpose of facilita­
ting debt and debt service reduction, and for enabling develo­
ping countries to attain higher import and investment levels. 
This could also help reduce persistent trade imbalances 
among developed countries without depressing the world 
economy.
Where international monetary stability is concerned, it 
used to be argued that the replacement of fixed exchange 
rates by a floating exchange rate regime would facilitate a 
more efficient adjustment process by permitting small but 
frequent adjustment exchange rates. In practice, however, the 
floating rate regime has displayed a great deal of volatility 
and unpredictability and this has been a factor in strengthen­
ing protectionist trends. Moreover, an exchange rate regime 
which is subject to wide fluctuations has proved difficult to 
reconcile with a tariff-based trading system.
A major objective of development co-operation in the 
period ahead should, therefore, be to evolve a symmetrical 
and equitable adjustment process that promotes economic 
growth, development and trade expansion at the highest sus­
tainable levels consistent with price stability. At the global 
level, this objective entails, among other things, an exchange 
rate regime which, while flexible, is capable of promoting 
international monetary stability; symmetry in the treatment 
of deficit, surplus and reserve currency countries so that the 
burden o f  adjustment is equitably shared; and effective 
macroeconomic policy co-ordination.
The proper functioning of the international trade and 
payments system also requires that international liquidity 
grows in line with the requirements of an expanding world 
economy. The experience of the 1980s has demonstrated 
that international lending and private capital flows cannot be 
relied upon to compensate for current account disequilibria;
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nor can the commercial banking system be relied upon to 
create international liquidity in line with the requirements of 
non-inflationary growth and development. Consequently, the 
central role of the IMF in the creation and distribution of 
international liquidity again assumes topical importance. The 
time is ripe for reconsidering the possibility of a new alloca­
tion of special drawing rights: the earlier objection that this 
would add to inflationary pressures in the world economy is 
no longer credible in the present period of strong anti-infla­
tionary policies in developed market-economy countries. 
In present conditions of extreme liquidity shortage for many 
developing countries, an issue of SDRs would make a major 
contribution to reconstituting their reserves. Continuing 
efforts would also have to be made towards establishing the 
role of SDRs as the principal reserve asset of the interna­
tional monetary system. Looking farther into the future, it 
has been suggested that in view of the growing integration of 
the world economy, the evolution of the IMF in the direction 
of a genuine international central bank may be desirable for 
the effective functioning of the international trade and pay­
ments system.
So far as macroeconomic policy co-ordination is con­
cerned, an encouraging feature of the 1970s was the recogni­
tion that the effectiveness of policy actions taken in one of 
the interrelated spheres of money, finance, trade and 
development was often influenced by, or dependent on, 
policy actions taken in other areas. There is greater aware­
ness also of the degree to which signals generated in increa­
singly integrated markets can engender major and unintended 
shifts in the world economy. In recent years, policy co-ordi­
nation has been pursued mainly among major developed 
market economies and has focused on external disequilibria 
affecting their own economies. Furthermore, the IMF has 
been authorized to monitor and evaluate the macroeconomic 
policies of these countries on the basis o f quantitative indica­
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tors related to growth, employment, inflation, investment, 
external reserves, etc. Even so, forms of co-ordination have 
not emerged which adequately address the fundamental con­
cerns of the rest of the world. The conclusion follows that 
these efforts should be extended to cover the harmonization 
of international policies in the interrelated fields of com­
modities, trade, money, finance and development, as well as 
national and regional economic policies in so far as they have 
a major impact on the world economy.
Effective policy co-ordination requires agreement on 
certain goals and on policy actions needed when outcomes 
differ from the agreed goals. Objectives, including desirable 
rates of growth of domestic demand as well as exchange rates 
and current account balances need to be consistent across the 
countries concerned. Such co-ordination would also need to 
take into account the implications for small economies which 
are open to influences from abroad, and would in any event 
call for considerable flexibility based on extensive consulta­
tions. In the same context, multilateral surveillance would 
also have to be strengthened to include assessment of policies 
affecting trade, capital flows, external adjustment and the 
functioning of the international monetary system.
UNCTAD and the Evolution of International Economic 
Relations
The establishment of UNCTAD in 1964 was a formal recogni­
tion of the need for a universal forum for intergovernmental 
deliberations and negotiations on issues related to trade and 
development, in the context of multilateral co-operation. It 
was also the expression of a growing concern that there was 
no single institution responsible for formulating and imple­
menting international policy in the field of trade comparable 
to the IMF and the World Bank in the respective fields of
56
international monetary relations and development finance.
Since its inception, UNCTAD has played a major role in 
the evolution of the development co-operation dialogue. Its 
main thrust has focused first on the formulation of policy 
measures within the existing institutional framework that 
would lend support to the development process and second 
on the search for improvements in the structures and arrange­
ments underpinning international economic relations so as to 
make them more supportive of macroeconomic management, 
structural adjustment and development. Through its inter­
governmental machinery, UNCTAD has provided a frame­
work for the negotiation of important policy advances and 
agreements, and a forum for intergovernmental deliberation, 
the outcomes of which have provided impetus for action in 
other international institutions responding to the needs of 
the developing countries and to the requirements of develop­
ment co-operation.
The role of UNCTAD has, of course, evolved under the 
guidance of successful sessions of the Conference. The con­
sensus embodied in the Final Act of the last Conference, 
UNCTAD VII, embodies constructive and significant 
advances in areas such as debt, commodities, international 
trade and action in favour of the least developed countries. 
The Final Act also continues to provide a valid framework 
for the formulation of specific policy measures. One impor­
tant component of this framework was the recognition tfjat if 
both national and international policies were growth-oriented 
and mutually-reinforcing, the interdependence of national 
economies and the interrelationships of different areas of 
economic policy would — in contrast to recent experience — 
become a vehicle for transmitting and cumulating positive 
impulses. A second component is the broad understanding 
that all countries, collectively and individually, are responsi­
ble for taking action, in accordance with their respective 
capacities and weights in the world economy, to accelerate
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and sustain development and to improve the health and stabi­
lity of  the world economy. Third, the Conference witnessed a 
more open discussion than hitherto in UNCTAD o f  the inter­
action between the external economic environment and the 
domestic policies and structural characteristics of developing 
countries. There was also a better acknowledgement of the 
respective contributions of the public and private sectors to 
development. Finally, the Conference proceedings expressed 
a strong concern to make the international monetary, finan­
cial and trading systems more supportive of growth develop­
ment, and international trade.
These elements have been reinforced by the Declaration 
adopted in October 1989 by the Trade and Development 
Board on the occasion of UNCTAD’s twenty-fifth anniver­
sary. The Declaration affirms that the main substantive 
challenge facing UNCTAD in the 1990s is to bring fresh 
thinking to bear on long-standing problems and new areas of 
concern, with a view to promoting innovating policy 
measures. UNCTAD, according to the Declaration, should 
do so taking full account of the interdependence of econo­
mies and of policy areas, of long-term structural changes in 
the world economy, as well as of the need for a more suppor­
tive and predictable international economic environment for 
trade and development, particularly of developing countries. 
It should also continue to pay special attention to economic 
problems faced in common by developing countries, notably 
in expanding and diversifying their production base and their 
trade in goods and services including their mutual trade, 
reducing commodity dependence, building financial, techno­
logical and transport capacities, coping with the debt burden 
and its consequences, adverse trends in resource flows, and 
undertaking adjustment programmes oriented to growth and 
development.
If UNCTAD is to continue to make the innovative sub­
stantive contributions expected of it to multilateral co-opera­
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tion in all these areas, member States, in co-operation with 
the Secretariat, need to give full effect to their commitment, 
expressed in the Declaration, not only to the objectives of 
UNCTAD but also their pledge, individually and collectively, 
to rise to the challenges just mentioned and to make 
UNCTAD a more effective instrument of international co­
operation for trade, growth and development, particularly 
of developing countries.
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